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Late March 2014. On a Lisbon’s early sunny morning, the view from the Ministry of 
Finance towards Terreiro do Paço’s square was just as any other day: people heading to work 
in a country that is fighting to stand back on its feet, after almost 3 years of a harsh economic 
adjustment program. At the window, Maria Luís Albuquerque, the Finance Minister, is on the 
phone with the Prime Minister, Pedro Passos Coelho, discussing how Portugal should exit the 
adjustment program. The answer to this question was in accessing Portugal’s capacity to finance 
itself in the global financial markets and in what conditions, especially at which interest rate. 
By this time, Portugal had successfully completed several milestones that brought investors’ 
confidence back to the market and allowed for some room of maneuver in the decision-making 
process. Official creditors, the “Troika”, wanted the country to remain committed to structural 
reforms, while Portugal aimed to prove it had succeeded in the adjustment program and was 
now ready to stand on its own going forward. The country had done a huge effort since 2011, 
having suffered from a severe recession, high unemployment, high interest rates, credit rating 
downgrades, budget constraints, among others, and needed to end the adjustment process with 
a victory that could launch the country to a new era of prosperity. 
1. Deterioration of financial conditions 
It all started with the U.S. Subprime Crisis, in 2008, which quickly spilled into global 
financial markets, culminating in a financial crisis that spread throughout the world. With global 
financial markets almost collapsing, investors started considering the possibility of Euro 
Sovereign debt being subject to default risk, effectively no longer being considered risk-free, 
but having a credit risk component. In this scenario, markets started watching out for the 
countries with high indebtedness levels and/or pronounced budget deficits, which was mainly 
the case of five peripheral countries – Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain and Portugal (Exhibits 1 
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and 2). As a result, the Sovereign bonds spreads1 of these countries started to rise (Exhibit 3). 
On November 5th, 2009, the Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou announced that 
Greece’s budget deficit was significantly higher than the original estimates2, which caused 
investors to demand higher interest rates, with Greece having increasing difficulty in accessing 
the market. This situation ended up having a contagion effect on the other peripheral countries, 
as the market anticipated that similar problems could take place. Finally, on May 2nd, 2010, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Eurozone countries agreed on a financing package 
of €110 billion to rescue Greece. Five months later, Ireland succumbed to market pressure, 
entering a €85 billion bailout program on November 29th, 2010. The last country requesting 
financial assistance was Portugal, on April 6th, 2011. Initially, the program was planned to 
include € 80 billion, although it ended up as a € 78 billion program3, since the last of the twelve 
disbursements was not executed4. Regarding Italy and Spain, despite an increase in spreads due 
to the overall market environment, their spreads remained relatively under control (below 300 
bps) until then (Exhibit 3). 
Focusing in the case of Portugal, the country was already experiencing macroeconomic and 
financial imbalances since the beginning of the decade. Particularly, after joining the Euro in 
2002, Portugal’s economic growth was weak, having experienced two years of recession (2003 
and 2009), as shown in Exhibit 4. Portugal was facing macroeconomic imbalances, namely 
measured by several years of a highly negative current account balance, reaching a peak of          
-12.1% of GDP in 2008 (Exhibit 5), thus reflecting a lack of competitiveness relatively to other 
Eurozone members. Nevertheless, public debt profile was perfectly normal, particularly with 
 
1 In Sovereign bond markets, the spread corresponds to the difference between the 10-year Government bond 
yield of a given country and Germany, the benchmark. 
2 More specifically, it corresponded to 12.7% of the GDP anticipated for 2009, which was roughly the double of 
the previous estimate and more than four times the maximum deficit allowed by EU rules – 3% of GDP. 
3 From the €78 billion, €26 billion were provided by the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM), €26 
billion by the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and €26 billion by the IMF. 
4 The last €2 billion were exempt especially because the amount of medium and long-term debt that was issued 
by Portugal in the market was larger than initially predicted. 
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relatively low Government bond spreads (Exhibit 6) and most of the debt being held by foreign 
investors (Exhibits 7 and 8). However, after the severity of the 2008 financial crisis, investors 
started to demand higher premiums on more fragile economies.  
In an attempt to restore confidence in the Portuguese Government bond market, the 
Government started to implement a different set of measures, so as to reduce expenditures and 
increase Government revenues. In January 2010, the State Budget for the year was approved by 
the Council of Ministers, with the aim to decrease the budget deficit to the 3% mark by 2013. 
For this purpose, the Government created, in March, a program called “Programa de 
Estabilidade e Crescimento” or PEC. Contrary to the first three versions, the fourth version of 
this program was not approved in the Parliament, being the primary trigger for the resignation 
of the country’s Prime-Minister, José Sócrates, on March 23rd. A few days later, on April 6th, 
2011, Portugal formally requested financial assistance to the IMF and the European Institutions, 
soon establishing the beginning of a period of tight budget control, economic reform measures 
and loss of market access. 
In what regards the rating agencies’ classification of Portugal5, in the beginning of 2010, 
Portugal was classified as AA by Fitch, A+ by S&P and Aa2 by Moody’s, but quickly dropped 
several notches to BBB- by Fitch, BBB- by S&P and Baa1 by Moody’s just prior to the official 
request for financial assistance (Exhibit 9). Portuguese ratings were cut due to the deterioration 
of public finances, the lack of competitiveness of the country and especially given the sharp 
increase on the spread of Portuguese Government Bonds (PGB) due to lack of investors’ 
confidence in the country. However, although the Republic was still able to maintain the 
investment grade status at this point, it would soon be lost, changing completely the nature of 
the PGB market. Until the beginning of 2009, most of Portuguese debt was held by foreign 
 
5 Although the most recognized credit rating agencies in financial markets are Standard & Poor's (S&P), Moody's 
and Fitch Group, DBRS also played an important role in the case of Portugal, particularly in 2015, with regards to 
the Quantitative Easing program conducted by the European Central Bank (ECB). 
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investors, particularly near 90% of PGB (long-term debt) and 80% of Treasury Bills (short-term 
debt), as shown in Exhibits 7 and 8. With the deterioration of the country’s financial situation, 
the increase in spread to Germany and 2010 rating downgrades, foreign investors started to sell 
Portuguese holdings and were essentially replaced by Portuguese banks. 
The Government entity responsible for the execution of the funding program for Portugal 
is called “Agência de Gestão da Tesouraria e da Dívida Pública” or IGCP, E.P.E6. Every year, 
the IGCP needs to borrow an amount equal to the State’s deficit plus all debt that matures on 
that same year. Based on those borrowing needs, the Treasury will determine the amount of 
PGB and T-Bills to be issued. A normal execution of the funding plan would be characterized 
as a combination of both syndications7 and debt auctions8 for the long-term debt (ranging from 
2 up to 30 years maturities), through the issuance of PGB, and regular auctions for the short-
term debt (from 3 to 12 months), through the issuance of T-Bills. During the years of 2009 and 
2010, the execution of the funding plan was still performed with reasonable normality, although 
interest rates were already on a rising trend, especially in 2010 (Exhibit 10). Apart from the 
market instruments, the IGCP also has an old relationship with retail customers, through the 
Saving Certificates, which allow retail investors to lend to the State in the form of short-term 
lending. However, these became unattractive when compared to the interest rates offered by 
bank deposits, especially in the years of 2010, 2011 and 2012 as banks fought for liquidity by 
rising interest rates on term deposits, which ultimately led to continuous withdrawals from the 
Saving Certificates (Exhibit 11). In July 2010, in an attempt to counter this trend, the IGCP 
created a new instrument that would allow retail investors to lend to the State on a long-term 
 
6 For simplification purposes, IGCP, E.P.E. is hereby called as IGCP. 
7 A syndication is a procedure to issue debt in which the issuer hires investment banks to find demand for the 
new debt, in return of a fee. Usually, syndications are used to issue new securities and in large sizes. In the case 
of Portugal, it was normally used once per year and would typically mean the issuance of € 2-3 billion. 
8 A debt auction is the main procedure to issue debt used by Sovereigns. It is performed regularly throughout the 
year and in smaller sizes when compared to syndications. In the case of Portugal, it was common to have an 
auction at least once per month and the size would normally be between € 1-1.5 billion. 
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basis, the Treasury Certificates9, which benefitted from more attractive interest rates. 
In 2011, as previously explained, the situation of the peripheral countries had significantly 
deteriorated, with a sharp increase in Government bonds spreads (Exhibit 3). At the beginning 
of 2011, Portugal’s spread to Germany was 370bps, an increase of 300bps since the beginning 
of the previous year. In absolute terms, the 10-year rate was now at 6.6% and approaching 
“unsustainable” levels (Exhibit 10). In this scenario, on January 12th, the IGCP issued, through 
a debt auction, € 650 million of 4-year debt at 5.44% and € 600 million of 10-year debt at 6.76% 
(Exhibit 12). It is important to note that Portugal would not issue 10-year debt for another 2 
years and 4 months since that date. On February 7th, Portugal returned to the market to issue a 
new 5-year bond through a syndication. In March and April, Portugal issued its last two auctions 
prior to the request of the official assistance, with maturities of 3 and 2 years, paying 6.05% and 
6.25%, respectively. Regarding T-Bills (Exhibit 13), there were eight auctions in the first three 
months of the year, with maturities of either 6 or 12 months. At this point, the cash reserves 
were very low and the country was desperate for new funding to sustain its large budget deficit. 
However, financing costs were rising every week and it was becoming unsustainable to keep 
the current situation, as the country risked being unable to finance itself and collapse. Finally, 
the April 6th arrived and the IGCP started the day with an auction where two T-bills series were 
issued. The interest rates obtained were as high as 5.12% for the 6-month and 5.90% for the 12-
months, while the 10-year PGB was trading at 8.43%, with the Government opting to request 
official financial assistance later that day.  
2. Loss of market access 
The Economic Adjustment Program10 was negotiated between the Portuguese authorities 
and the Troika, constituted by the European Commission, the IMF and the ECB, with the goal 
 
9 The Treasury Certificates were a savings product directed at the retail market with maturity up to 10 years and 
an adjustable rate of return that would follow the interest rate of PGB for the chosen maturity. 
10 The Economic Adjustment Program was abbreviated as PAEF, in Portuguese, which stands for “Programa de 
Assistência Económica e Financeira”.  
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of regaining investors’ confidence and promoting competitiveness, based on fiscal 
consolidation and sustainable economic growth. After this demanding program was initiated, 
on May 17th, Pedro Passos Coelho was elected as the new prime minister, on June 5th. Since the 
elections resulted in an absolute majority, the necessity of negotiating with the other parties was 
reduced, becoming easier to implement the program. Nevertheless, although this new 
Government would eventually calm down the markets, foreign investors continued to withdraw 
money from the Portuguese economy (Exhibits 7 and 8), hence contributing to aggravate its 
situation. Moreover, with the peripheral countries in distressed situation, investors were closing 
their positions in the periphery and buying “core” countries’ debt, in a move known as “flight 
to quality”, further exacerbating the spread widening in these countries. 
Combining the deteriorating situation of the Eurozone with the aforementioned reasons, 
Portugal saw its rating being downgraded to non-investment grade by the major credit rating 
agencies. Moody’s downgraded to Ba2 on July 5th, 2011, followed by Fitch decreasing a notch 
to BB+ on November 21st and, lastly, S&P downgraded the country to BB on January 13th, 2012 
(Exhibit 9). The fact that Portugal started being classified as speculative grade had a huge 
negative impact on the PGB market. Global indexes of Sovereign bonds11, followed by a large 
proportion of investors, allocate their investments based on the relative size of the debt of that 
country compared to the others. However, only investment grade countries' debt is allowed to 
join these indexes. By falling into speculative grade territory, Portugal was removed from these 
and, consequently, all the investors that followed those indexes had to sell their exposure to 
Portugal, in a situation that became known as "forced sellers". As a result, while the percentage 
of PGB held by foreign investors kept decreasing at a slower pace (Exhibit 7), the percentage 
of T-Bills held by foreign investors completely collapsed, coming from 80% in the beginning 
 
11 Among these indexes, the most relevant ones are Barclays Euro Government Bond Index, Citi World 
Government Bond Index and J.P. Morgan Government Bond Index. 
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of 2010 to about 5% in the beginning of 201212 (Exhibit 8). 
During this phase, the activity of IGCP suffered a significant change, particularly, medium 
and long-term debt stopped being issued, with a total suspension of PGBs auctions or 
syndications (Exhibit 12). However, in order to meet short-term obligations, the country still 
managed to continue issuing T-Bills, this time with maturities only up to 7 months (Exhibit 
13), in order to contain interest costs. In this environment, the debt structure suffered a 
significant change during the year, with a smaller contribution of all the rubrics to compensate 
for the PAEF financing (Exhibit 14). 
When the program started, one of the measures that were imposed by the Troika was to 
build a cash buffer with a size that would allow the Republic to continue facing its financing 
needs for a period of 6 months to 1 year in times of market volatility where financing in the 
market was not available, thus increasing confidence in the Portuguese bond market. The IGCP 
continuously used the cash buffer throughout the adjustment period to buyback short-term debt, 
smoothening the redemption profile, hence reducing the burden for the future. Moreover, as the 
interest rate on Portuguese debt was high, these buyback operations allowed the country to 
reduce the cost of the cash buffer. 
Following a substantial upward trend throughout the past months, the 10-year Portuguese 
Government yield reached its maximum value, equal to 16.61%, on January 30th, 2012 (Exhibit 
10). This was mainly driven by the unstable environment felt in Europe and the aggressive 
credit ratings downgrades on the Portuguese debt. 
3. A change in trend – regaining investors’ confidence 
Fortunately, the situation started to revert through time, with Government bond yields 
decreasing from February 2012 onwards, as evidenced in Exhibit 10. Also, credit default swaps 
 
12 The percentage of PGB held by foreigners decreased at a slower pace compared to T-Bills because the majority 
of investors that did not follow indexes (were not forced sellers) kept their positions until maturity and did not 
reinvest back in Portugal. As T-Bills have maximum a maturity of 12 months, in 1 year time, the holders of T-Bills 
can drastically change, while PGB take much more time to do so. 
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were on a declining trajectory (Exhibit 15), again confirming that investors’ confidence in 
Portugal was returning. Several measures contributed to this positive outcome, where one can 
highlight the recent favourable economic data, the continuous compliance with the plan 
proposed by Troika, the ECB’s announcement of Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) and 
the several roadshows conducted by the IGCP. Regarding the OMT announcement on August 
2nd, 2012, it made possible for the ECB to buy, in the secondary market, Sovereign bonds issued 
by Eurozone countries when certain conditions were fulfilled. Although this program was never 
used, it positively impacted the market by decreasing the spreads of peripheral countries, simply 
due to investors’ expectations. With regards to IGCP’s marketing strategy, by regularly meeting 
with investors, it was possible to update them on the steps being taken to overcome the situation 
of the country and, ultimately, to convince them that Portugal was a good bet. 
Although the situation of the country was improving, broader market volatility was very 
high, mainly because Spain and Italy were on the verge of losing market access. From 
November 2011 to July 2012, Spain and Italy’s 10-year Government Bonds were already 
trading between 5% and 7,6% (Exhibit 16). At this point, the Eurozone was on its most delicate 
moment since inception, as the market believed that it would not be possible to financially 
rescue Italy, given the large size of its debt. Still, the Eurozone was saved due to Mario Draghi’s 
renowned speech in July 2012 at Jackson’s Hole- “within our mandate, the ECB is ready to do 
whatever it takes to preserve the euro. And believe me, it will be enough”. Indeed, this was a 
turning point to restore investors’ confidence in the Eurozone, avoiding the collapse of the euro 
as the single currency. Consequently, Government bond yields and spreads for peripheral 
countries started to decline (Exhibits 3 and 16). 
Regarding the management of public debt, the average maturity of issued T-Bills started to 
increase, with several auctions with maturities of 6 and 12 months, issued with yields much 
lower than the ones in the previous year (Exhibits 17 and 18). Furthermore, on April 4th, 2012, 
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the country sold € 1 billion of 18-month T-bills at a yield of 4.54%, which corresponded to the 
longest maturity sold for a long period of time, thus reducing the roll-over risk. Following the 
same trend, as the country started recovering, foreign investors (particularly the US and the UK) 
started presenting net buying flows from September onwards. The majority were hedge funds 
and some more flexible fund managers, which were the first non-domestic investors to perceive 
value in Portuguese debt, allowing to diversify the investor base. Nevertheless, these investors 
were characterized as “Fast Money”, as they searched for quick profit opportunities and would 
exit their positions in periods of market volatility. Thus, it was imperative to bring the “Real 
Money”13 community of investors back to the PGB market soon to assure a more stable market 
going forward. Nevertheless, by being classified as non-investment grade, Portugal was 
automatically excluded from many buy&hold investors, such as European asset managers, 
insurance companies or pension funds, demanding a harder work in terms of marketing from 
the IGCP, traveling around Europe to convince investors that Portugal was on the right track 
and would soon be back to investment grade status. To take advantage of the interest in 
Portuguese debt, the IGCP conducted a debt exchange operation on October 3rd, 2012, which 
allowed to convert €3.76 billion of bonds maturing in September 2013 into bonds with maturity 
in October 2015, with a yield of 5.12% (Exhibit 12). This extension in maturity proved that 
investors started regaining confidence in the Portuguese debt market, thus establishing the 
return to the financial markets. 
4. Normalization of Portuguese funding 
During this phase, the Treasury enjoyed a relevant cash buffer, arising particularly from an 
increase in short-term debt and from the centralisation of public entities’ cash under the single 
control of the IGCP. This allowed for a more efficient management of resources due to 
 
13 Real money investors (also called as buy&hold) is the name given to investors who, contrary to fast money 




economies of scale, obtaining higher returns on cash reserves. The Portuguese debt market was 
improving significantly, with larger turnover and liquidity in the secondary market, a higher 
number of real-money investors interested in Portuguese debt and yields continuously getting 
lower. Notably, the 10-year Government bond spread fell to levels prior to the PAEF for the 
first time, reaching a value of 4.85% on January 3rd, 2013 (Exhibit 6), and CDS observing a 
significant fall, from a maximum of 1,527 basis points (bps) on January 30th, 2012 (the day in 
which the 10-year Portuguese Government yield reached its maximum value) to less than 400 
bp in the first days of 2013 (Exhibit 15).  
Since the Republic was predicting heavier redemptions in the years of 2016 and 2021, the 
Portuguese authorities asked for an extension of the official loans of the EFSF and EFSM, which 
was granted on April 12th, 2013, given the steady strong compliance with the adjustment 
program. The maturity of the EFSF and EFSM loans was extended by 7 years14, increasing the 
average maturity to 19.5 and 22 years, respectively, thus smoothing the debt redemption profile. 
The Treasury continued to enjoy strong demand for short-term debt, issuing T-Bills with 
long maturities at decreasing interest rates (Exhibits 17 and 18). As evidenced in Exhibit 8, 
the percentage of non-domestic holders of T-Bills began to increase in the beginning of 2013, 
evidencing a stronger confidence in the Portuguese market. On January 23rd, 2013, the Republic 
executed the first OT syndication since February 2011 (Exhibit 12), establishing the return to 
the medium-term bond market, issuing at the 5 years maturity. This operation consisted on a € 
2.5 billion tap15 of OT 4.35% October 2017 and attracted a large order book of € 12 billion, 
with more than 300 investors participating, particularly non-domestic ones. As evidenced in 
Exhibits 19 and 20, most of the new bonds were allocated to buy&hold investors (with 60% to 
asset managers followed by hedge funds with 24%), whereas in geographical terms, the US and 
 
14 This 7-years extension in maturities was granted not only to Portugal, but also to Ireland. 
15 Tap means the reopening of an existing bond. In this case, it was a syndicated tap, i.e. a bond reopening through 
a syndicated transaction. 
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the UK were the countries with higher shares (33% and 29%, respectively). A few months later, 
on May 7th, a very important milestone was accomplished, with the Treasury returning to the 
long-term bond market, issuing a € 3 billion syndicated 10-year bond at a yield of 5.67%. This 
transaction was very well timed, with the 10-year Portuguese Government yields enjoying the 
lowest values since August 2010 (Exhibit 10). The trade was backed by an overall orderbook 
of more than € 10 billion, which translated into a bid to cover ratio of 3.48. There was a 
significant improvement in investor quality compared to the previous transaction, namely 
through a larger participation from insurance companies and pension funds (12%) and lower 
participation from hedge funds (7%), while asset managers kept the largest share (51%). In 
geographic terms, traditional buy&hold regions like France, Germany, Italy and Scandinavia 
increased their participation, while a decline was felt in fast money related regions, such as the 
US. 
Notwithstanding, the path through the crisis was not a smooth ride. During the summer 
2013, the Fed tapering16 announcement induced an increase in the yields of the Sovereigns 
(Exhibit 16). Additionally, to worsen the situation, the political stability in Portugal, which was 
seen as a major advantage by investors, got compromised, with Vítor Gaspar, Finance Minister 
between 2011 and 2013, resigning on July 1st, 2013, due to the lack of cohesion inside the 
Government. On the following day, Paulo Portas, Minister of Foreign Affairs, also resigned 
over the appointment of Maria Luís Albuquerque as the new Minister of Finance. As a 
consequence, volatility in the Portuguese debt market rose sharply, especially due to the fear of 
a coalition breach with subsequent elections, with investors reducing their exposure to the PGB 
market. However, Paulo Portas opted to preserve its position and Maria Luís Albuquerque, 
considered a market-friendly minister, substituted Vítor Gaspar. Thereby, the country returned 
to its recovery path, with yields going back to a descending trajectory (Exhibit 10). 
 
16 Fed tapering consists on the gradual reversal of quantitative easing policy. 
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In October, aiming to diversify the funding sources, the IGCP launched a new retail 
instrument, the Treasury Certificates Savings Plus17, and increased the return on the current 3-
month Savings Certificates. These changes allowed to attract the savings of many small 
investors, in a period where the stock of Treasury and Saving Certificates was near its minimum 
(Exhibit 11), turning retail products into an important source of revenue on the overall funding 
strategy (Exhibit 14). For the first time since 2008, the year of 2013 had a larger amount of 
both Treasury and Savings Certificates issued comparatively to the amount withdrawn. 
In order to decrease the financing burden for the next two years, a debt exchange operation 
with two lines was conducted on December 3rd (Exhibit 12). The Treasury managed to 
exchange € 2.5 billion maturing in 2014 and € 4.2 billion maturing in 2015 into € 2.7 billion 
maturing in October 2017 and € 4 billion in June 2018. One month later, on January 9th, the 
Treasury reopened the OT 4,75% Jun 2019 for a 5-year issuance, being more than three times 
oversubscribed. There was a significant participation from investors from Scandinavia, 
Germany, Austria, France and Italy, with UK investors still holding 38% of the debt issued, 
although on a decreasing trend. Regarding the distribution in sectorial terms, the majority of the 
percentage was assigned to buy&hold investors, namely with 61.5% to asset managers and 
15.5% to pensions funds. On the following month, on February 11th, a new tap was performed, 
this time with a maturity of 10 years. € 3 billion were raised at a yield of 5.11% percent by 
reopening the February 2024 bond. Once again, most of the amount was allocated to the UK, 
but this time with only 26%, as the share of other European countries increased. Concerning 
short-term debt, regular T-Bills auctions were held throughout this period, with most maturities 
ranging from 3 to 12 months (Exhibit 17). As expected, yields had been decreasing through 
time (Exhibit 18), reflecting the improvement in the country’s financing conditions. 
 
17 A Treasury Certificates Savings Plus or Certificado do Tesouro Poupança Mais (CTPM) was an instrument with 
a maturity of five years and interest rates of 1.25% in the first year, 1.75% in the second, 2.25% in the third, 2.75% 




A very important achievement was made on April 23rd, 2014- the reintroduction of PGB 
auctions. On this day, a 10-year tap was issued at a yield of 3.59% and a bid to cover ratio of 
3.47. This represented a very relevant step on the normalization of market access because PGB 
auctions are not punctual/ opportunistic operations like syndications, but instead regular 
transactions from the Treasury, being the main financing tool used by debt management offices 
across Europe.  
By then, it was only a few months before exiting the program and Portugal faced different 
alternatives on how to exit, it could either be through a second program, a precautionary credit 
line or a “clean” exit. A second program would consist in another loan from the Troika and, in 
return, the acceptance of another austerity program, for a period of 2/3 years. The precautionary 
credit line, as the name suggests, would be a source of funds made available to Portugal by the 
official institutions in case it was needed, for example in periods of high market volatility when 
market access would be restrained, in exchange for austerity measures and structural reforms. 
Finally, the “clean” exit would consist in the absence of any support from the Troika going 
forward, with Portugal having to finance itself in the capital markets and being subject to market 
volatility that could pressure its ability to do so, without any “safety net”.  
On May 4th, 2014, Pedro Passos Coelho announced that Portugal was going to make 
a “clean” exit on May 17th. At the moment of the prime-minister’s announcement, the 10-year 
bond yield was trading at 3.59%, which was in line with the lowest levels in several years 
(Exhibit 10). Although the outlook was positive, it was still crucial that the consolidation of 
public finances as well as significant structural reforms were attained, in order to ensure the 
sustainability of Portuguese debt. 
5. Portugal by itself 
With the end of the adjustment program, Portugal was now on its own in international 
financial markets, without any type of support from official institutions. As such, it was of major 
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importance to execute the funding program in the smoothest and safest possible way, in order 
to give confidence to the market. The Treasury continued to focus on roadshows and meetings 
with investors, so as to increase the investor base and mitigate refinancing risk. After exiting 
the PAEF, the IGCP executed another three PGB auctions in 2014, focusing on the 5-year and 
10-year maturities (Exhibit 12). Investors’ participation in the auctions was large, with a 
growing appetite for Portuguese debt by foreign investors. On September 3rd, 2014, the Treasury 
took the opportunity to issue a new 15-year bond, proving that Portugal could access the longer 
part of the curve in capital markets. Moreover, in order to diversify the investor base, the 
Republic issued a 10-year bond of USD 4.5 billion, targeting US investors. This new 
benchmark, the USD Out 2024 was issued under the EMTN program18, with an amount 
equivalent to €3.3 billion and 86% of demand allocated to American real money investors. The 
last PGB transaction of the year occurred on November 26th and consisted on a debt exchange 
operation with two lines. The Treasury exchanged bonds maturing in 2015 and 2016 into bonds 
maturing in 2021 and 2023, allowing to reduce the financial burden over the next two years. 
Regarding short-term debt, in an environment of lower interest rates, the IGCP favored longer 
maturities in its T-Bills auctions (Exhibit 17), hence increasing the average debt duration. 
After three years of negative economic growth, the country was finally on a positive growth 
trend, with GDP growing 0.79% in 2014 (Exhibit 4). Nevertheless, it was also the year in which 
Government debt reached its maximum level of 132.9% of GDP (Exhibit 21), much impacted 
by the resolution of BES19. 
At the same time, in the second semester of 2014, expectations about the implementation 
of quantitative easing (QE) in the Eurozone started to emerge, with the purpose of stimulating 
 
18 An EMTN or Euro Medium Term Note consists on an instrument issued outside the US or Canada, but requiring 
a fixed-dollar payment. 
19 Banco Espírito Santo (BES) was the second largest listed Portuguese bank, which was bailed out by the 
Portuguese Resolution Fund in August 2014, having received a €3.9 billion loan from the State, thus impacting 
the country’s deficit and debt figures. 
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the economy. Particularly, in January 2015, the ECB announced it would buy €60bn of 
Sovereign bonds each month until, at least, September 2016. This unconventional monetary 
policy started being enforced in March 2015, while the US QE programs took place between 
2008 and 2014. In the first months of 2015, the market positively reacted to the QE 
announcement, with bond yields and spreads decreasing aggressively across the Eurozone 
(Exhibits 3 and 16), even with T-Bills reaching negative values in May (Exhibit 22). The 
rating agency DRBS played a crucial role in this figure, since QE rules required that the ECB 
could only buy bonds from Sovereigns rated as investment-grade by either S&P, Fitch, Moody’s 
or DBRS. At the time, DRBS was the only agency that classified Portugal as such, thus allowing 
the Portuguese debt to be bought under the Program (Exhibit 9). Considering this favourable 
low yield environment, the Treasury was very active in issuing medium and long-term debt, 
executing several syndications, auctions and debt exchange operations throughout 2015. 
One can say that full market access was completely recovered in January 2015, with the 
Treasury executing a dual-tranche syndicated transaction (Exhibit 12), in which the longest 
tranche had a maturity of 30 years, being the first transaction at this maturity since March 2006. 
This meant that Portugal was now able to fund itself on any maturity, even on the very long part 
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Exhibit 5: Portugal Current Account, % of GDP, 2000-2015. 
 
Source: Pordata 
Exhibit 6: Portuguese 10-year Government bond spreads versus Germany (%), 2009-2014. The 
first red dot corresponds to the day of the financial assistance request (April 6th, 2011), whereas 
the last dot respects the day in which Portuguese spread went back to pre-Program levels 
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Exhibit 7: Long Term Public Debt, % hold by domestic vs non-domestic investors, 2007-
2015. 
 
Source: Banco de Portugal 
 
Exhibit 8: Short Term Public Debt, % hold by domestic vs non-domestic investors, 2007-
2015. 
 



























Exhibit 9: Evolution of Portuguese debt ratings by the major rating agencies (Moody’s, Fitch, 
S&P and DBRS), 2005-2015. The first red line corresponds to the day of the financial assistance 
request (April 6th, 2011), whereas the last respects the day in which Pedro Passos Coelho 
announced that Portugal was going to exit the PAEF (May 4th, 2014).   
 
















Exhibit 11: Stock of Treasury and Saving Certificates, € million, 2008-2015. 
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Bid to Cover 
ratio
Auction PGB 4.95 10/25/23 1/13/2010 10/25/2023 15 Years 1,000 4.43% 2.00
Syndication PGB 4.8 06/15/20 2/10/2010 6/15/2020 10 Years 3,000 4.82% 4.00
Auction PGB 3.35 10/15/15 2/24/2010 10/15/2015 5 Years 1,000 3.51% 1.80
Auction PGB 3.85 04/15/21 3/10/2010 4/15/2021 10 Years 990 4.19% 1.60
Auction PGB 5 06/15/12 4/14/2010 6/15/2012 2 Years 805 1.73% 2.50
Auction PGB 4.8 06/15/20 4/14/2010 6/15/2020 10 Years 1,195 4.35% 1.60
Auction PGB 4.8 06/15/20 5/12/2010 6/15/2020 10 Years 1,000 4.58% 1.80
Auction PGB 3.35 10/15/15 5/26/2010 10/15/2015 5 Years 1,000 3.75% 1.80
Auction PGB 5.45 09/23/13 6/9/2010 9/23/2013 3 Years 701 3.63% 2.40
Auction PGB 4.8 06/15/20 6/9/2010 6/15/2020 10 Years 816 5.25% 1.80
Auction PGB 3.35 10/15/15 6/23/2010 10/15/2015 5 Years 943 4.72% 1.80
Auction PGB 5 06/15/12 7/14/2010 6/15/2012 2 Years 877 3.21% 2.32
Auction PGB 4 3/4 06/14/19 7/14/2010 6/14/2019 9 Years 803 5.33% 1.55
Auction PGB 4.95 10/25/23 7/28/2010 10/25/2023 15 Years 681 5.41% 1.60
Auction PGB 3.6 10/15/14 7/28/2010 10/15/2014 4 Years 600 3.65% 3.13
Auction PGB 4.2 10/15/16 8/25/2010 10/15/2016 6 Years 629 4.41% 2.10
Auction PGB 4.8 06/15/20 8/25/2010 6/15/2020 10 Years 672 5.33% 1.80
Auction PGB 5.45 09/23/13 9/8/2010 9/23/2013 3 Years 661 4.12% 1.90
Auction PGB 3.85 04/15/21 9/8/2010 4/15/2021 10 Years 378 5.99% 2.60
Auction PGB 3.6 10/15/14 9/22/2010 10/15/2014 4 Years 450 4.72% 3.50
Auction PGB 4.8 06/15/20 9/22/2010 6/15/2020 10 Years 300 6.25% 4.90
Auction PGB 4.45 06/15/18 10/27/2010 6/15/2018 8 Years 614 5.16% 1.70
Auction PGB 3.6 10/15/14 10/27/2010 10/15/2014 4 Years 611 4.05% 2.80
Auction PGB 4.8 06/15/20 11/10/2010 6/15/2020 10 Years 686 6.85% 2.10
Auction PGB 4.2 10/15/16 11/10/2010 10/15/2016 6 Years 556 6.19% 2.30
Auction PGB 4.8 06/15/20 1/12/2011 6/15/2020 10 Years 599 6.76% 3.20
Auction PGB 3.6 10/15/14 1/12/2011 10/15/2014 4 Years 650 5.44% 2.60
Syndication PGB 6.4 02/15/16 2/7/2011 2/15/2016 5 Years 3,500 6.46% 1.86
Auction PGB 5.45 09/23/13 3/9/2011 9/23/2013 3 Years 1,000 6.05% 1.60
Auction PGB 5.45 09/23/13 4/1/2011 9/23/2013 2 Years 1,645 6.25% 1.40
Debt Exchange PGB 3.35 10/15/15 10/3/2012 10/15/2015 3 Years 3,757 5.12%
Syndication PGB 4.35 10/16/17 1/23/2013 10/16/2017 5 Years 2,500 4.89% 4.91
Syndication PGB 5.65 02/15/24 5/7/2013 2/15/2024 10 Years 3,000 5.67% 3.48
Debt Exchange PGB 4.45 06/15/18 12/3/2013 6/15/2018 5 Years 3,966 4.96%
Debt Exchange PGB 4.35 10/16/17 12/3/2013 10/16/2017 4 Years 2,676 4.68%
Syndication PGB 4 3/4 06/14/19 1/9/2014 6/14/2019 5 Years 3,250 4.66% 3.47
Syndication PGB 5.65 02/15/24 2/11/2014 2/15/2024 10 Years 3,000 5.11% 3.26
Auction PGB 5.65 02/15/24 4/23/2014 2/15/2024 10 Years 750 3.59% 3.47
Auction PGB 5.65 02/15/24 6/11/2014 2/15/2024 10 Years 975 3.28% 2.43
Syndication PGB 3 7/8 02/15/30 9/3/2014 2/15/2030 15 Years 3,500 3.92% 2.55
Auction PGB 4.8 06/15/20 10/8/2014 6/15/2020 5 Years 1,000 1.86% 1.80
Auction PGB 5.65 02/15/24 11/12/2014 2/15/2024 10 Years 1,200 3.18% 2.07
Debt Exchange PGB 3.85 04/15/21 11/26/2014 4/15/2021 6 Years 943 2.16%
Debt Exchange PGB 4.95 10/25/23 11/26/2014 10/25/2023 9 Years 805 2.84%
Syndication PGB 4.1 02/15/45 1/13/2015 2/15/2045 30 Years 2,000 4.13% 3.00
Syndication PGB 2 7/8 10/15/25 1/13/2015 10/15/2025 10 Years 3,500 2.92% 2.28
Auction PGB 2 7/8 10/15/25 2/11/2015 10/15/2025 10 Years 1,250 2.51% 1.88
Auction PGB 2 7/8 10/15/25 2/25/2015 10/15/2025 10 Years 1,499 2.04% 1.82
Debt Exchange PGB 5.65 02/15/24 4/23/2015 2/15/2024 9 Years 3,151 1.79%
Debt Exchange PGB 3 7/8 02/15/30 4/23/2015 2/15/2030 15 Years 876 2.47%
Syndication PGB 4.1 02/15/45 4/24/2015 2/15/2045 30 Years 500 3.31% 1.28
Syndication PGB 2 7/8 10/15/25 4/24/2015 10/15/2025 10 Years 2,000 2.18% 2.37
Auction PGB 3.85 04/15/21 5/27/2015 4/15/2021 6 Years 1,000 1.55% 1.72
Auction PGB 4.8 06/15/20 7/22/2015 6/15/2020 5 Years 900 1.42% 1.89
Auction PGB 4.1 04/15/37 7/22/2015 4/15/2037 20 Years 600 3.53% 1.70
Syndication PGB 2.2 10/17/22 9/2/2015 10/17/2022 7 Years 3,000 2.24% 1.86
Auction PGB 4.1 04/15/37 10/14/2015 4/15/2037 20 Years 350 3.23% 1.85
Auction PGB 2 7/8 10/15/25 10/14/2015 10/15/2025 10 Years 950 2.40% 1.62
Auction PGB 2 7/8 10/15/25 11/25/2015 10/15/2025 10 Years 995 2.43% 1.85
24 
 
Exhibit 13: Treasury Bills issues, 2010-2015. 





Bid to Cover 
ratio
PORTB 0 07/23/10 1/6/2010 1/8/2010 6 Months 600 0.59% 4.75
PORTB 0 01/21/11 1/20/2010 1/22/2010 12 Months 1,250 0.93% 2.24
PORTB 0 01/21/11 2/3/2010 2/5/2010 12 Months 300 1.38% 4.00
PORTB 0 02/18/11 2/17/2010 2/19/2010 12 Months 1,000 1.17% 2.20
PORTB 0 09/17/10 3/3/2010 3/5/2010 6 Months 544 0.74% 3.00
PORTB 0 02/18/11 3/3/2010 3/5/2010 12 Months 630 1.10% 3.10
PORTB 0 03/18/11 3/17/2010 3/19/2010 12 Months 1,250 1.04% 3.20
PORTB 0 03/18/11 4/7/2010 4/9/2010 11 Months 500 1.05% 2.80
PORTB 0 07/23/10 4/21/2010 4/23/2010 3 Months 575 0.48% 2.40
PORTB 0 01/21/11 4/21/2010 4/23/2010 9 Months 500 1.08% 1.80
PORTB 0 11/19/10 5/5/2010 5/7/2010 6 Months 500 2.96% 1.90
PORTB 0 02/18/11 5/19/2010 5/21/2010 9 Months 500 2.44% 2.30
PORTB 0 09/17/10 6/2/2010 6/4/2010 4 Months 560 1.86% 3.50
PORTB 0 03/18/11 6/16/2010 6/18/2010 9 Months 718 2.69% 1.80
PORTB 0 01/21/11 7/7/2010 7/9/2010 6 Months 762 1.95% 1.80
PORTB 0 07/22/11 7/21/2010 7/23/2010 12 Months 1,253 2.45% 1.30
PORTB 0 02/18/11 8/4/2010 8/6/2010 6 Months 660 1.96% 2.37
PORTB 0 07/22/11 8/4/2010 8/6/2010 12 Months 505 2.39% 2.17
PORTB 0 11/19/10 8/18/2010 8/20/2010 3 Months 775 0.99% 2.50
PORTB 0 08/19/11 8/18/2010 8/20/2010 12 Months 750 2.73% 1.80
PORTB 0 03/18/11 9/1/2010 9/3/2010 6 Months 500 2.05% 2.40
PORTB 0 08/19/11 9/1/2010 9/3/2010 12 Months 512 2.76% 2.10
PORTB 0 09/23/11 9/15/2010 9/17/2010 12 Months 750 3.37% 1.60
PORTB 0 09/23/11 10/6/2010 10/8/2010 12 Months 500 3.33% 2.80
PORTB 0 10/21/11 10/6/2010 10/8/2010 12 Months 500 1.60% 3.00
PORTB 0 10/21/11 10/20/2010 10/22/2010 12 Months 760 2.89% 2.40
PORTB 0 02/18/11 11/3/2010 11/5/2010 4 Months 500 1.82% 2.20
PORTB 0 10/21/11 11/3/2010 11/5/2010 12 Months 531 3.26% 2.20
PORTB 0 11/18/11 11/17/2010 11/19/2010 12 Months 750 4.81% 1.80
PORTB 0 11/18/11 12/1/2010 12/3/2010 12 Months 500 5.28% 2.51
PORTB 0 03/18/11 12/15/2010 12/17/2010 3 Months 500 3.40% 1.90
PORTB 0 07/22/11 1/5/2011 1/7/2011 6 Months 500 3.69% 2.62
PORTB 0 01/20/12 1/19/2011 1/21/2011 12 Months 750 4.03% 3.10
PORTB 0 08/19/11 2/2/2011 2/4/2011 6 Months 455 2.98% 4.80
PORTB 0 01/20/12 2/2/2011 2/4/2011 12 Months 800 3.71% 2.60
PORTB 0 02/17/12 2/16/2011 2/18/2011 12 Months 1,000 3.99% 1.90
PORTB 0 09/23/11 3/2/2011 3/4/2011 6 Months 550 2.98% 2.60
PORTB 0 02/17/12 3/2/2011 3/4/2011 12 Months 450 4.06% 3.10
PORTB 0 03/23/12 3/16/2011 3/18/2011 12 Months 1,000 4.33% 2.20
PORTB 0 10/21/11 4/6/2011 4/8/2011 6 Months 550 5.12% 2.30
PORTB 0 03/23/12 4/6/2011 4/8/2011 12 Months 455 5.90% 2.60
PORTB 0 07/22/11 4/20/2011 4/26/2011 3 Months 680 4.05% 2.00
PORTB 0 11/18/11 4/20/2011 4/26/2011 7 Months 320 5.53% 3.70
PORTB 0 08/19/11 5/4/2011 5/6/2011 4 Months 1,117 4.65% 1.90
PORTB 0 07/22/11 5/18/2011 5/20/2011 2 Months 1,000 4.66% 2.05
PORTB 0 09/23/11 6/1/2011 6/3/2011 4 Months 850 4.97% 2.70
PORTB 0 09/23/11 6/15/2011 6/17/2011 3 Months 388 4.95% 3.81
PORTB 0 12/23/11 6/15/2011 6/17/2011 6 Months 612 4.86% 2.40
PORTB 0 10/21/11 7/6/2011 7/8/2011 4 Months 848 4.93% 2.00
PORTB 0 10/21/11 7/20/2011 7/22/2011 3 Months 450 4.98% 2.40
PORTB 0 01/20/12 7/20/2011 7/22/2011 6 Months 300 4.96% 3.70
PORTB 0 02/17/12 8/3/2011 8/5/2011 6 Months 750 4.97% 2.56
PORTB 0 11/18/11 8/17/2011 8/19/2011 3 Months 985 4.85% 1.80
PORTB 0 02/17/12 8/17/2011 8/19/2011 6 Months 172 4.99% 7.20
PORTB 0 12/23/11 9/7/2011 9/9/2011 4 Months 854 4.96% 2.19
PORTB 0 12/23/11 9/21/2011 9/23/2011 3 Months 1,000 4.93% 1.70
PORTB 0 03/23/12 9/21/2011 9/23/2011 6 Months 250 5.25% 4.50
PORTB 0 01/20/12 10/5/2011 10/7/2011 4 Months 722 4.97% 2.25
PORTB 0 01/20/12 10/19/2011 10/21/2011 3 Months 432 5.25% 3.68
PORTB 0 04/20/12 10/19/2011 10/21/2011 6 Months 1,071 4.97% 2.03
PORTB 0 02/17/12 11/2/2011 11/4/2011 4 Months 1,244 5.00% 2.00
PORTB 0 02/17/12 11/16/2011 11/18/2011 3 Months 773 4.90% 2.40
PORTB 0 05/18/12 11/16/2011 11/18/2011 6 Months 350 5.25% 4.10




PORTB 0 04/20/12 1/4/2012 1/6/2012 3 Months 1,000 4.35% 2.39
PORTB 0 07/20/12 1/18/2012 1/20/2012 6 Months 754 4.74% 2.97
PORTB 0 12/21/12 1/18/2012 1/20/2012 11 Months 1,250 4.99% 2.14
PORTB 0 05/18/12 2/1/2012 2/3/2012 4 Months 750 4.07% 2.81
PORTB 0 07/20/12 2/1/2012 2/3/2012 6 Months 750 4.46% 2.65
PORTB 0 05/18/12 2/15/2012 2/17/2012 3 Months 300 3.85% 10.30
PORTB 0 08/17/12 2/15/2012 2/17/2012 6 Months 1,200 4.33% 2.53
PORTB 0 02/22/13 2/15/2012 2/17/2012 12 Months 1,500 4.94% 2.02
PORTB 0 07/20/12 3/21/2012 3/23/2012 4 Months 382 2.17% 6.70
PORTB 0 03/22/13 3/21/2012 3/23/2012 12 Months 1,610 3.65% 2.50
PORTB 0 10/19/12 4/4/2012 4/10/2012 6 Months 500 2.90% 5.00
PORTB 0 10/18/13 4/4/2012 4/10/2012 18 Months 1,000 4.54% 2.60
PORTB 0 11/23/12 5/2/2012 5/4/2012 7 Months 500 2.94% 4.14
PORTB 0 05/17/13 5/2/2012 5/4/2012 12 Months 1,000 3.91% 2.74
PORTB 0 12/21/12 6/6/2012 6/8/2012 6 Months 500 2.65% 4.31
PORTB 0 06/21/13 6/6/2012 6/8/2012 12 Months 1,000 3.83% 2.71
PORTB 0 01/18/13 7/18/2012 7/20/2012 6 Months 750 2.29% 3.82
PORTB 0 07/19/13 7/18/2012 7/20/2012 12 Months 1,250 3.50% 2.36
PORTB 0 03/22/13 9/19/2012 9/21/2012 6 Months 709 1.70% 3.10
PORTB 0 03/21/14 9/19/2012 9/21/2012 18 Months 1,291 2.97% 2.40
PORTB 0 01/18/13 10/17/2012 10/19/2012 3 Months 250 1.37% 8.11
PORTB 0 04/19/13 10/17/2012 10/19/2012 6 Months 830 1.84% 2.81
PORTB 0 10/18/13 10/17/2012 10/19/2012 12 Months 770 2.10% 2.49
PORTB 0 02/22/13 11/21/2012 11/23/2012 3 Months 300 1.94% 5.09
PORTB 0 05/17/13 11/21/2012 11/23/2012 6 Months 500 2.17% 4.49
PORTB 0 05/23/14 11/21/2012 11/23/2012 18 Months 1,200 2.99% 1.91
PORTB 0 04/19/13 1/16/2013 1/18/2013 3 Months 300 0.67% 3.80
PORTB 0 01/17/14 1/16/2013 1/18/2013 12 Months 1,200 1.61% 2.30
PORTB 0 07/18/14 1/16/2013 1/18/2013 18 Months 1,000 1.96% 2.70
PORTB 0 05/17/13 2/20/2013 2/22/2013 3 Months 345 0.74% 2.40
PORTB 0 02/21/14 2/20/2013 2/22/2013 12 Months 1,155 1.28% 2.30
PORTB 0 06/21/13 3/20/2013 3/22/2013 3 Months 300 0.76% 3.90
PORTB 0 09/19/14 3/20/2013 3/22/2013 18 Months 1,200 1.51% 2.10
PORTB 0 07/19/13 4/17/2013 4/19/2013 3 Months 250 0.74% 4.80
PORTB 0 04/18/14 4/17/2013 4/19/2013 12 Months 1,500 1.39% 2.10
PORTB 0 11/22/13 5/15/2013 5/17/2013 6 Months 500 0.81% 1.80
PORTB 0 05/23/14 5/15/2013 5/17/2013 12 Months 1,250 1.23% 2.20
PORTB 0 12/20/13 6/19/2013 6/21/2013 6 Months 450 1.04% 2.50
PORTB 0 12/19/14 6/19/2013 6/21/2013 18 Months 1,050 1.60% 2.10
PORTB 0 12/20/13 7/17/2013 7/19/2013 5 Months 300 1.05% 4.40
PORTB 0 07/18/14 7/17/2013 7/19/2013 12 Months 1,200 1.72% 1.80
PORTB 0 11/22/13 8/21/2013 8/23/2013 3 Months 300 1.62% 3.40
PORTB 0 08/22/14 8/21/2013 8/23/2013 12 Months 700 0.77% 2.20
PORTB 0 12/20/13 9/18/2013 9/20/2013 3 Months 500 1.08% 1.80
PORTB 0 03/20/15 9/18/2013 9/20/2013 18 Months 750 2.29% 2.00
PORTB 0 01/17/14 10/16/2013 10/18/2013 3 Months 450 1.71% 1.80
PORTB 0 07/18/14 10/16/2013 10/18/2013 9 Months 1,050 1.16% 1.50
PORTB 0 02/21/14 11/20/2013 11/22/2013 3 Months 300 1.08% 3.00





PORTB 0 04/18/14 1/15/2014 1/17/2014 3 Months 240 0.49% 4.71
PORTB 0 01/23/15 1/15/2014 1/17/2014 12 Months 1,010 0.87% 2.23
PORTB 0 05/23/14 2/19/2014 2/21/2014 3 Months 250 0.46% 6.26
PORTB 0 02/20/15 2/19/2014 2/21/2014 12 Months 1,000 0.75% 2.12
PORTB 0 09/19/14 3/19/2014 3/21/2014 6 Months 320 0.44% 4.63
PORTB 0 03/20/15 3/19/2014 3/21/2014 12 Months 930 0.60% 1.70
PORTB 0 01/23/15 4/16/2014 4/18/2014 9 Months 325 0.49% 4.08
PORTB 0 04/17/15 4/16/2014 4/18/2014 12 Months 925 0.60% 1.57
PORTB 0 08/22/14 5/21/2014 5/23/2014 3 Months 250 0.43% 5.66
PORTB 0 05/22/15 5/21/2014 5/23/2014 12 Months 1,000 0.62% 1.75
PORTB 0 09/19/14 6/18/2014 6/20/2014 3 Months 500 0.18% 1.64
PORTB 0 06/19/15 6/18/2014 6/20/2014 12 Months 1,000 0.36% 1.32
PORTB 0 01/23/15 7/16/2014 7/18/2014 6 Months 400 0.24% 2.46
PORTB 0 07/17/15 7/16/2014 7/18/2014 12 Months 850 0.45% 2.05
PORTB 0 11/21/14 8/20/2014 8/22/2014 3 Months 200 0.10% 3.36
PORTB 0 08/21/15 8/20/2014 8/22/2014 12 Months 800 0.22% 1.79
PORTB 0 12/19/14 9/17/2014 9/19/2014 3 Months 250 0.05% 2.98
PORTB 0 09/18/15 9/17/2014 9/19/2014 12 Months 750 0.23% 1.92
PORTB 0 01/23/15 10/15/2014 10/17/2014 3 Months 250 0.11% 3.72
PORTB 0 07/17/15 10/15/2014 10/17/2014 9 Months 750 0.20% 1.47
PORTB 0 02/20/15 11/19/2014 11/21/2014 3 Months 200 0.16% 3.33
PORTB 0 11/20/15 11/19/2014 11/21/2014 12 Months 800 0.32% 1.59
PORTB 0 12/18/15 12/3/2014 12/5/2014 12 Months 850 0.28% 1.80
PORTB 0 07/17/15 1/21/2015 1/23/2015 6 Months 300 0.11% 2.60
PORTB 0 01/22/16 1/21/2015 1/23/2015 12 Months 940 0.22% 1.99
PORTB 0 05/22/15 2/18/2015 2/20/2015 3 Months 250 0.06% 4.26
PORTB 0 01/22/16 2/18/2015 2/20/2015 11 Months 1,000 0.14% 1.99
PORTB 0 09/18/15 3/18/2015 3/20/2015 6 Months 300 0.05% 2.78
PORTB 0 03/18/16 3/18/2015 3/20/2015 12 Months 950 0.09% 1.99
PORTB 0 07/17/15 4/15/2015 4/17/2015 3 Months 300 0.01% 4.62
PORTB 0 03/18/16 4/15/2015 4/17/2015 11 Months 950 0.02% 1.68
PORTB 0 11/20/15 5/20/2015 5/22/2015 6 Months 300 0.00% 4.61
PORTB 0 05/20/16 5/20/2015 5/22/2015 12 Months 1,200 0.02% 1.97
PORTB 0 09/18/15 6/17/2015 6/19/2015 3 Months 200 0.04% 5.10
PORTB 0 05/20/16 6/17/2015 6/19/2015 11 Months 550 0.16% 3.13
PORTB 0 01/22/16 7/15/2015 7/17/2015 6 Months 650 0.01% 2.05
PORTB 0 07/22/16 7/15/2015 7/17/2015 12 Months 1,135 0.09% 2.07
PORTB 0 11/20/15 8/19/2015 8/21/2015 3 Months 400 -0.01% 3.14
PORTB 0 07/22/16 8/19/2015 8/21/2015 11 Months 750 0.02% 2.01
PORTB 0 03/18/16 9/16/2015 9/18/2015 6 Months 300 0.01% 4.07
PORTB 0 09/23/16 9/16/2015 9/18/2015 12 Months 1,000 0.05% 2.06
PORTB 0 01/22/16 10/21/2015 10/23/2015 3 Months 300 -0.02% 3.37
PORTB 0 09/23/16 10/21/2015 10/23/2015 11 Months 1,100 0.01% 1.84
PORTB 0 05/20/16 11/18/2015 11/20/2015 6 Months 400 -0.02% 2.72
PORTB 0 11/18/16 11/18/2015 11/20/2015 12 Months 1,100 -0.01% 2.18
PORTB 0 03/18/16 12/16/2015 12/18/2015 3 Months 248 -0.02% 3.38
PORTB 0 11/18/16 12/16/2015 12/18/2015 11 Months 750 0.03% 1.87
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Exhibit 14: Composition of stock of debt structure by type of instrument (%), 2009-2015. 
 
Source: IGCP’s annual reports 
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Exhibit 18: Yields of issued T-Bills (%), 2010-2015. 
Source: IGCP 
 
Exhibit 19: Distribution by investor type (%) for the syndications of February 10th, 2010, 
February 7th, 2011, January 23rd, 2013 and May 7th, 2013. 
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Exhibit 20: Distribution by geography (%) for the syndications of February 10th, 2010, 
February 7th, 2011, January 23rd, 2013 and May 7th, 2013. 
Source: IGCP’s press release 
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